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Abstract
The global financial crisis caused public discussions on the efficiency of the supervisory institutions of the EU financial sector. 
This paper identified the changes of the EU financial supervisory system and evaluated the directions for improvement of the 
reform. The logical method is used for making a substantiated generalization of the collected facts and formulating transitional as 
well as final conclusions of the research. Seeking to evaluate the existing banking regulation in Lithuania and the EU, the method 
of systematic analysis is applied. The results of the study show that the recent integrated supervision models failed to quickly and 
efficiently respond to the financial crisis. Ordinary European System of Financial Supervision (ESFA) is insufficient to prevent 
splitting of the European financial market.
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Introduction
The intervention of the European Union states in the rescue of the banking sector started in 2008/2009 alongside 
with the worldwide financial crisis on a dramatic scale. The support for the states was rendered in a variety of forms. 
Consequently, that made a negative effect on the public finances of the states which resulted in a moral hazard. The 
actions of that kind caused public discussions on the efficiency of the supervisory institutions of the financial sector 
on the macro and micro levels and disclosed the problems of that sector. Supervision is so far carried out based on 
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different national rules without regard of the fact that the single market was established 23 years ago. It became 
clear that the existing supervisory measures were insufficient to avoid, to manage and to overcome crisis. The 
national supervisory models lag behind the modern reality, i.e. the integrated and interrelated European financial 
markets, where numerous financial enterprises operate on a cross-border scale. Unsuccessful regulation and 
supervision of financial markets should be regarded as one of the main causes of the worldwide financial crisis of 
2008 (The Turner review, 2009; McCarty, Keith, Pole… 2010; Levine, 2010).
The studies performed show that the EU institutions and Member States started an unprecedented reform of the 
performance of supervisory institutions. The presented landmarks of the reform of the banking system and 
integration of the European supervisory system aim at ensuring stability of global financial systems and returning 
trust in the markets (Larosiere, 2009; Liikanen, 2012; Masciandro, Pansini, Quityn, 2011; Miklaszewska, 
Mikolajczyk, Pawlowska, 2012). With regard to that, the aim of this paper is to assess the reform of the EU 
institutional system of financial supervision and the trends of its improvement. The authors identify institutional 
changes within the EU financial supervisory system after the financial crisis. A special attention is devoted to the 
establishment of the Banking Union characterized by a more integrated viewpoint and which can supplement the 
space of a single currency and internal market.
The research problem is formulated on the basis of the research questions: how the supervision and 
reorganization of the banking system should be carried out locally and globally?; what new supervisory mechanisms 
of financianl market must be created and how do they have to function?; To what degree are interference and control 
of the supervisory institutions appropriate, so that freedom of action is not violated and negative effect is avoided?
Practical implications of the paper confirmed that the recent integrated supervision models failed to quickly and 
efficiently respond to the financial crisis. Ordinary European System of Financial Supervision (ESFA) is insufficient 
to prevent splitting of the European financial market. Some mechanisms fail to fulfill their functions due to the 
intricacy of their internal structure and the size of the EU banking sector. The European Banking Union should 
make sufficient changes in this area.
The logical method is used for making a substantiated generalization of the collected facts and formulating 
transitional as well as final conclusions of the research. Seeking to evaluate the existing banking regulation in 
Lithuania and the EU, the method of systematic analysis is applied. Together with the logical method, the 
generalization method is used which helped to identify general and major features and characteristics of mechanisms 
analyzed in this paper.
1. The Institutional Model of European Financial Supervision
The EU Founding Treaty fails to contain a special chapter on the regulation of financial services. The greatest 
attention is devoted to harmonization of supervisory rules and requirements with the view of tightening and unifying 
the supervisory terms in the EU and internationally. For a long time, adoption of supervisory measures for financial 
markets was based on the so-called Lamfalussy process (2001). A new structure of committees was established 
aimed at simplification of the decision making process and promoting efficiency of financial markets supervision 
(Hix, 2006). Later, however, the reform of the process became inevitable. Regarding that fact, the European 
Commission authorized a group of experts headed by J.Larosiere, to analyze the situation and put forward possible 
schemes of financial supervision and regulation. In 2009 the report was publicized where 31 practical 
recommendations on how to improve the whole supervisory mechanism were put forward (Larosiere, 2009). That 
was how a new European system of financial supervision (ESFA) was established which started in 2011 
(Regulations (EU) No 1092/2010, 1093/2010, 1094/2010, 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council,
2010). That was an important achievement in a further integration of a single market of financial services. ESFA is 
responsible for ensuring the EU system of financial supervision on two levels.
The supervision of macro-level risk restriction on the European level is carried out by the European Systemic 
Risk Board (Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010). The Board’s aim 
is to prevent systemic risk threatening the EU financial stability and to minimize its effect with regard to macro-
economic changes. When the ESFA thinks that a critical situation might occur, it provides confidential warning to 
the Council as well as the evaluation of the system. The European system of financial supervision on a micro-level 
consists of the multilayer system of the appointed institutions. Different layers can be distinguished according to the 
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area of sectoral supervision and regulation (banking, insurance and securities markets) and according to the level of 
supervision and regulation (European and national). Three European institutions are responsible for the supervision 
of the micro-level risk, the institutions which replaced the former European supervision committees: the European 
Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
Fig.1. Structure of the European financial supervisory institutions. Source: Skrzypek, 2010.
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA). The research results, however, show that the recent integrated supervision models failed to quickly and 
efficiently respond to the financial crisis. Despite the fact that the supervision of banks is carried out on the EU level, 
the directives provide that it is to be further implemented on the national level. The ordinary European Supervisory 
System (ESFA) and coordination are insufficient to prevent disunity of the European financial markets. Some 
mechanisms fail to perform their functions due to the intricacy of their internal structure and the size of the EU 
banking sector.
2. The Future Changes of the EU Financial Supervision Model
The presented considerations on the situation in the Euro-zone put forward a number of important questions. 
How should the supervision and reorganization of the banking system be carried out locally and globally? What 
makes those processes successful? To what degree are interference and control of the supervisory institutions 
appropriate, so that freedom of action is not violated and negative effect is avoided? Those are the issues that the 
Banking Union or the so-called integrated financial system is seeking to address. That is one of the main changes to 
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be made in the EU supervisory model. Additional or double financial supervision will exceptionally cover only 19 
member States of the Euro-zone. That conception is a response to the global financial crisis and is developed to 
ensure financial stability as well as to minimize the cost of the bank failures. Many authors suggest that the Banking 
Union should be based on full and detailed summary of the rules of financial services as well as on innovative 
structure of supervisory institutions. Since the subject is new, the authors’ works are for the most part based on 
general approach achieved in the EU Council. The researchers review and identify structural and organizational 
schemes and measures of the establishment of the Banking Union (Zaleska, 2013; Lannoo, 2012; Breus, 2013; Gros 
and Shoenmaker, 2014; Beck (ed.), 2012).
The Banking Union is going to be based on a three-stage model consisting of three pillars: Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS). At the start the 
Member States agreed on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013). 
Fig.2. Three pillars of the Banking Union. Source: adopted by Petersen, 2014
It came into effect on November 4, 2014. The Central European Bank directly supervises 128 banks of the Euro-
zone (out of 6000 in operation). Its performance is based on the national supervisory procedures and institutions. 
The mechanism is applied for systemic banks. The bank’s importance will be evaluated based on the following 
Single Rulebook (CRD IV: Capital Requirements Directive)
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criteria: size, importance for European economy or for any other Member State involved and the importance for 
cross-border operation. With regard to that, the credit institution under the supervision of ECB must satisfy all of 
them. The total worth of its assets exceeds 30 billion EUR, or account for more than a fifth (20%) of GDP of the 
Member State. The ECB can on its own account consider that the institution is of special importance, on condition 
that it has established banking subsidiaries in more than one Member State and its cross-border assets or liabilities 
account for a big portion of all its assets or liabilities. Other banks which fail to meet those criteria remain under the 
supervision of national institutions; however, the ECB shall interfere in case it is necessary. The bank supervision 
mechanism provides that three biggest Lithuanian banks, i.e. SEB, DNB and Swedbank shall be directly supervised 
by the European Central Bank. The Bank of Lithuania shall only assist in performing supervision functions. The 
ECB shall qualify how the biggest banks of Lithuania ensure that the requirements for capital adequacy and liquidity 
are met and shall supervise the bank’s internal control. The Bank of Lithuania shall further supervise smaller banks, 
but the CEB, however, shall have the right to take over their control.
Another essential pillar of the Banking Union is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It is to supplement the 
Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM) and is the second step in creating the Banking Union. SRM shall ensure that 
in case the banks face difficulties despite strict supervision, they can be efficiently reorganized at the smallest 
possible costs for the taxpayers and the real economy (Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
2014). The funding of the reorganization is based on the complex multi-stage system or so-called “responsibilities 
cascade model”. Its core is very simple: financing is to be provided by the markets, i.e., from the funds of the 
finance sector. The banking reorganization rules do not contain the provision that taxpayers are to bail out the failing 
banks, which led the countries to deep crisis. In the first place, loses shall be paid by the investors and depositors 
who are actually responsible for the operation of the banks.
The element which is absolutely necessary for proper SRM operation is the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). It 
should be directly funded by the ex ante contributions of the banks and its finances should be raised on the Union 
level, so that reorganization resources can be objectively distributed among all the Member States. The same funds 
financed by the ex ante contributions of the national banks shall be established in all the Member States of the Euro-
zone (National bank reorganization funds). That is the way to provide harmonious transition from the “bail outs” 
(difficulties are overcome at somebody else’s expense) to “bail ins” (loses are paid by themselves), and bank 
supervision is supplemented by a strong and integrated system designed for the rescue of the failing banks. That 
mechanism is to start from 2016. However, in that context, there emerges a question on raising and using the funds 
in the SRF. The Fund will in the first place be related to the national rules regulating the usage of the funds on the 
national level and later their transfer to the supranational fund. Is it possible that there may be some contradictions 
between the national and European rules? It is also important to provide a sufficiently strict protection mechanism 
so that the funds of the Lithuanian national budget are not allocated to finance the SRF. That is especially applicable 
for that stage of the fund’s establishment when the funds are insufficient to harness the crisis.
Conclusions
The results of the study show that the recent integrated supervision models failed to quickly and efficiently 
respond to the financial crisis. Ordinary European System of Financial Supervision (ESFA) is insufficient to prevent 
splitting of the European financial market. Some mechanisms fail to fulfill their functions due to the intricacy of 
their internal structure and the size of the EU banking sector. On the other hand, the study results show that the 
Banking Union (double financial supervision of the Euro-zone countries) will cause dramatic changes in that area. 
The new financial markets supervision model ensures a more integrated approach. The Banking Union is to 
supplement the area of the single currency and the internal market.
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